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Abstract
We estimate remaining life expectancy at age 65 using a very large sample of male
German pensioners. Our analysis is entirely nonparametric. Furthermore, the data
enable us to compare life expectancy in eastern and western Germany conditional on
a measure of socio-economic status. Our findings show a lower bound of almost fifty
percent (six years) on the difference in remaining life expectancy between the lowest
and the highest socio-economic group considered. Within groups, we find similar
values for East and West. Our analysis contributes to the literature in several aspects.
First, Germany is clearly underrepresented in differential mortality studies. Second,
we are able to use a novel measure of lifetime earnings as a proxy for socio-economic
status that remains valid for retired people. Third, the comparison of eastern and
western Germany may provide some interesting insights for transformation countries.
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1 Introduction
The international literature on socio-economic status and mortality is marked by a persist-
ing absence of Germany.1 This scarcity of studies is probably owed to the lack of large high
quality datasets. Luckily, the situation has changed since the inception of the Research
Data Centre of the German Pension Insurance (Forschungsdatenzentrum der Rentenver-
sicherung). Using these data enables us to make a number of, albeit small, contributions
to the existing literature.
Most obviously, we document mortality inequalities among elderly men in Germany.
The data permits us to compare the regions of the former GDR with the rest of Germany.
Due to the very different institutions for forty years, differences may well be expected.
In addition, the German pension system enables us to measure socio-economic status by
means of a variable that we term lifetime earnings. It is a discounted sum of pensionable
earnings over the life-cycle. We argue that this is a very broad measure of socio-economic
status that is also readily usable for the retired population. Finally, due to the large size
of our dataset, we do not need to recur to any parametric assumptions on the structure
of the relationship between lifetime earnings and mortality. Hence we are able to provide
credible estimates of life expectancies which provide a summary measure of mortality that
is readily understood in terms of meaning and magnitude, which is not the case for many
other typically used measures.
For the remaining life expectancy at age 65, our results indicate a lower bound of six
1See for example Mackenbach et al. (2003) or Huisman et al. (2004) and the references cited therein.
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years on the difference between the lowest and the highest earnings group considered in our
study. That is a difference of almost fifty percent measured from the lowest group. Between
the two extremes, life expectancy rises almost linearly in lifetime earnings. Despite the
fact that we do find lower overall mortality in the West than in the East, our results show
similar life expectancies within income groups. The unconditional difference hence comes
from composition effects.
Our results document a pure correlation between lifetime earnings and mortality. From
our estimates, nothing can be said about the underlying pathways that lead to these
figures. In general, three broad channels of causality can be imagined. Epidemiologists
stress the importance of causality from income to health (Marmot 1999). Economists are
often preoccupied with quantifying the reverse direction by which it is a low health status
that impairs current and future earnings capacity (Smith 2004). A third explanation
is that there are one or more underlying factors determining both income and health.
Among many potential candidates are genetics, ability, intelligence social skills, networks,
and other background or early life factors such as parental income (Case, Lubotsky, and
Paxson 2002), or education (Lleras-Muney 2005). We see our contribution in documenting
a strong relationship between lifetime earnings and life expectancy in Germany that calls
for more research on its origins.
The structure of this paper is the following. We first describe the data that we use in
Section 2, with particular emphasis on the German pension system and the calculation of
the central explanatory variable. Section 3 contains the presentation of our results in three
stages before turning to some international comparisons. Finally, section 4 concludes.
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2 Data
We use a very large dataset of administrative records from the German Public Pension
System. For reasons explained in section 2.2, we consider only male individuals. Our
data cover more than eighty percent of the whole male population born 1936 and earlier.
Consider the first and fifth column of Table 1 in the Appendix on page 30. These show our
sample sizes and what part of the general population is covered by our data broken down
by age group and place of residence. Coverage is about three quarters in the West, but
it drops substantially at older ages to less than two thirds. Part of this may be explained
by overestimation of the general population in the official public records (Jdanov, Scholz,
and Shkolnikov 2005), although we use numbers from the Human Mortality Database
that already contain a correction for this issue. Another part is likely to be differential
mortality - people outside the system tend to have a higher socio-economic status. In terms
of selection bias, we do not see any reason why results on differential mortality among the
pensioners covered by our data should not extend qualitatively to the rest of the population.
Numbers in the East are much nicer with coverages of up to 98 percent. This is because
in the former GDR, virtually everybody was insured within the state pension system.
In the next section we turn to the derivation of the central variable of our analysis, an
internal measure of the Public Pension System that is used to calculate pension benefits. It
is called personal earnings points and serves reasonably well as an indicator of total lifetime
earnings. Section 2.2 presents descriptive statistics on the variables used in our analysis and
deals with the creation of our dataset from several sources of the administrative records.
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2.1 The German Public Pension System
The German Public Pension System in the form that is relevant for the cohorts studied in
this analysis is a pay-as-you-go system based on a single tier. Benefits are directly related
to personal earnings over the life-cycle.2 This section provides a very brief introduction to
those parts of the system that are relevant for the purposes of the paper. Our description
is based on Bo¨rsch-Supan and Wilke (2004) and VDR (2004). The system covers all
private and public sector employees, excluding only civil servants (about 7 percent of the
workforce) and most self-employed (about 9 percent). The latter can self-insure in the
system, we will get back to this in section 2.2. Our focus is on old-age pensions which
are paid to all retirees age 65 and above. By the end of the calender year in the course of
which age 65 is completed, virtually everybody is retired.3
Key to the system are the so-called earnings points, which essentially are a measure
of the relative annual earnings position. In any given year t, the earnings points for
contribution periods (EPCP ) of an individual i are calculated as:
EPCPit =
pensionable earningsit
average pensionable earningst
(1)
In 2002, pensionable earnings were the first 4,500 Euro of gross monthly wages if the
individual’s earnings were above the minimum earnings threshold of 325 Euro. A subset of
our data contains the sum of EPCPit over all t with relevant contributions for each individual
2For a simple taxonomy of pension systems and an international comparison cf. OECD (2005)
3For the 1936 cohort (the youngest included in our analysis), internal statistics of the Deutsche Renten-
versicherung show that only 0.56 percent were not retired on 1st January 2002, the starting point of our
analysis.
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(we call this variable EPCPi ). Note that this variable is subject to a difficult form of right
censoring because of the annual upper limit to pensionable income. Hence we know only
a lower bound for the earnings of people with high EPCPi . This has to be kept in mind
when interpreting the results. We note that because of the division by average pensionable
earnings in (1), the discount rate inherent to EPCPi is the annual wage growth rate.
For administrative reasons, EPCPi is available only for individuals who retired after
1992, the year of a major reform to the system. The measure present for all persons in our
dataset is called personal earnings points (EPpers). These are calculated as follows:
EPpersi = (EP
CP
i + EP
NCP
i ) · AFi(2)
EPNCP stands for earnings points from non-contributory periods. These stem from spells
with no contributions at all which are nonetheless relevant for some pension benefits. These
include, for example, unemployment spells, some allowance for advanced education, and
the like. The adjustment factor AFi scales down benefits in the case of early retirement
after the 1992 reform. For our purposes it also serves to capture a type of minimum
pension benefit for low earnings (Mindestentgeltpunkte bei geringem Arbeitsentgelt) that
took place before 1992.
Individual pension payments are obtained directly from EPpersi by multiplication with
the current pension value that is common for all pensioners. In 2002 it was 25.86 Euro for
EPpersi earned in western Germany and 22.97 Euro for those EP
pers
i earned in the GDR.
Hence some 50 EPpers translate into a monthly gross pension payment of 1293.00 Euro
(1148.50 Euro) in the West (East). The current pension value is adjusted annually accord-
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ing to complex procedures, this does not impact upon our analysis. We only need the fact
that EPCP and EPpers remain constant once an individual receives an old-age pension. For
EPpers there are some minor qualifications to this, for example due to divorce or moving
abroad. Since we only include pensioners living in Germany (see section 2.2), the latter
does not impact upon our analysis and we treat the former as negligible.4
Obviously we prefer EPCP as a measure of lifetime earnings. For cohorts born after 1928
we can compare both measures. Correlations are very high with ρ ' 0.95. We present the
results of a comparative analysis of mortality experiences based on both different measures
in section 3.2. Our results show that the distinction is not all too important in terms of
describing the mortality experience by earnings group for ages 65 to 73. For the calculation
of life expectancies we also need the mortality experience of older cohorts. Hence we
extrapolate the similarity result and interpret EPpers as lifetime earnings although there is
larger error inherent to it. The nice feature of these variable is that they give us a measure
of long-run earnings. This is a much nicer measure for socio-economic status than current
income typically recorded in surveys. The latter is often blurred by transitory fluctuations
which are surprisingly high at first glance. These may lead to serious biases as documented
in Haider and Solon (forthcoming). Our discounted sum of lifetime earnings misses out
on some things typically included in the income definition (for example bequests, capital
income or transfers). Bearing the incompleteness in mind, we use lifetime earnings and
lifetime income as synonyms in the remainder of the paper.
4Calculations based on the “Versorgungsausgleichstatistik” show that changes in EPpers due to divorce
affect only 2.6% of the cases in our sample.
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Let us close this section with a quick illustration of the monthly pensionable income
necessary to accumulate a certain amount of earnings points. In 2002, the monthly gross
wage that yielded one EPpers was about 2,400 Euro. For simplicity, assume that this
number remains constant over an individual’s working life. Hence, to accumulate 50 EPpers,
a person with this wage would have to work 50 years. If average earnings over the life-cycle
were 3,000 Euro, 40 full years of contribution would be sufficient to accumulate the same
amount of EPpers.
2.2 Description of the Dataset
The administration of the German public pension system is marked by a variety of statutory
bodies. Traditionally, there have been regional pension insurance institutes for workers, a
federal institute for salaried employees, and three profession-specific institutes. Except for
miners, legal regulations have been the same since 1949, however. All pension insurance
institutes are required by law to report statistics of all pensioners as of the end of each
year as well as statistics of those pensioners who died during that year to their umbrella
association.5 We have access to this data.6 Because only selective characteristics of the
5This used to be the Verband Deutscher Rentenversicherungstra¨ger (VDR). After a major organisational
reform that took effect on 1st October 2005, its duties are fulfilled by the Deutsche Rentenversicherung
Bund, the federal pensions institute.
6Traditionally, only aggregate statistics were published. This has changed since the beginning of 2004
with the creation of the Research Data Centre of the Public Pension Insurance. Information about datasets
and access procedures can be found at http://www.fdz-rv.de. The process of data collection is described
in Rehfeld (2001)
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original administrative records enter our dataset, some important remarks about structure
and peculiarities of the data are in order.
For one thing, there is no way to link members of the same household. Ideally, we would
want to use lifetime household income as a relevant measure to correlate with mortality.
Because of the low female labour force participation in the cohorts relevant to our analysis,
we exclude them from the analysis. It is simply unclear what the household income position
of women with low EPCP is because of the dominance of male earnings in total household
income.
For all individuals in our dataset, we have the year and month of their birth available.
We only use individuals born in 1936 and earlier because of possible health and income
differentials in early retirement. Put differently, if we were to use younger pensioners, most
likely we would not have a random sample available. A further demographic variable is the
place of residence in three categories (eastern Germany, western Germany, foreign). We
exclude people with foreign domicile (2.3%) in order to work with a subset of those recorded
in official population statistics. Including them did not cause any visible differences in the
mortality estimates. The data contain all deaths in 2002, these are recorded on a monthly
level. The Appendix contains descriptive statistics for the entire sample in Table 2. Those
restricted to pensioners born after 1928 are listed in Table 3.
In terms of variables related to pension payments, the two most important ones are those
described in the last section. Note that EPpers is on average about 3.1 points (6.6 percent)
higher than EPCP in columns 1 and 5 of Table 3. We also have the corresponding variables
with respect to the length of being insured. These are pension-relevant insurance periods
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(IPPR) and contribution periods (CP). The former are comprised of the latter and non-
contributory periods eligible for pension benefits (for examples see Section 2.1). Last, we
use information on the type of health insurance coverage. Employees are mandatorily
covered in the public mutual funds system up to an earnings threshold that was 75% of
the maximum pensionable earnings until 2003. Individuals above that threshold, the self-
employed and civil servants can either insure voluntarily in the system or opt out to join
a private insurance company. A small subgroup of pensioners in our sample is insured
under foreign law, these persons usually worked in Germany only for short periods of time.
The arrangement of the last employment spell usually carries over to retirement. We can
identify the three groups (mandatorily insured / voluntarily or privately insured / insured
under foreign law) in our data.
The reason why this becomes important lies in work biographies that are not confined
to a single system of pension insurance. As an example, take somebody who is employed for
ten years and then becomes a civil servant for the rest of his working life. If we used EPCP
as a measure of his lifetime earnings, we would make a huge error because he had large
earnings outside the system. The health insurance variable as well as the length of pension
insurance periods enable us to (partially) control for such cases. This is why we estimate
life expectancies for four different subgroups of the population: All pensioners (“All”),
individuals mandatorily insured within the public health insurance scheme (“HI” ), those
with more than 25 years of pension-relevant insurance periods (“25Y”), both the “HI” and
“25Y” restrictions imposed (“HI25Y”). These make up the remaining columns of Tables 1
to 3. Looking at the population coverage in Table 1, it becomes clear that it drops to two
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thirds in the West if both restrictions are active. The decline is particularly sharp at older
ages because the differential mortality effect is reinforced (see below in section 3.1) and
because there are more missing values at old ages. The only variable that is completely
available is EPpers because it is central for the pension payment. In conversations with
statisticians at the Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund, we tried to evaluate the influence
of systematic effects on missing values. Except for the cases that we mention, there is no
reason to expect a missing at random assumption to be violated. In the East the picture
is much nicer again with coverage rates above ninety percent except for the very old ages.
There are three more variables available that we do not consider in the presentation
of differential mortality by lifetime earnings for clarity reasons. These are citizenship in
two categories (German/non-German), whether a pension entitlement for repatriates forms
part of the total pension, and whether EPpers includes a scaling-up of raw earnings points
because of low earnings before 1992 (cf. Section 2.1). Confining our analysis to Germans
that do not fall into either of the last two categories did not substantially alter any results,
tables and graphs are available from the authors upon request.
3 Results
We start with a brief and simple motivation of our analysis. Figure 1 shows the average
number of personal earnings points by birth cohort.7 The general pattern is very clear - they
rise over time. Remember from section 2.1 that EPpers does not change anymore within
7These are based on 1%-samples of all pensioners in 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001 (DRV 2005a)
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Figure 1: EPpers by Cohort, 1993-2001
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Note: All pensioners with at least 20 EPpers are included (selection All). The data are collected biannually,
cohorts are based on five-year birth intervals. Source: Forschungsdatenzentrum der Rentenversicherung,
SUFRTNWFXXXXDemo, SUFRTNBNXXXXDemo, own calculations.
persons after entering retirement. Hence, the only reason why it can change over time is by
composition of the cohort which in turn is almost entirely determined by mortality. The
rise is then due to persons with less than average EPpers dying relatively more frequently
than those with higher earnings points.
Shedding more light on this relationship by means of period life tables is the purpose
of this chapter. Ideally, we would prefer a cohort analysis in the spirit of our motivational
graphs. Given the structure of the administrative records, however, there is no straightfor-
ward way to follow cohorts over time and we confine our analysis to all cohorts in 2002. We
present our results in three parts. First, we look at the mortality experience of all German
pensioners by means of remaining life expectancy at age 65 (e65) and annual mortality
rates. We compare the two earnings points measures in the second part of the chapter.
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Because of data availability, the best we can do is to consider the probability of reaching
age 74, conditional on reaching age 65. Finally, we contrast the mortality experience of
persons living in the former GDR with those residing in the western part of Germany.
Throughout the analysis, we divide the sample into eleven equally spaced groups of
earnings points. We then present statistics for each of these. Due to the extremely large
sample size, we can afford the luxury of not recurring to any parametric assumptions in
calculating mortality rates. Lifetables are based on the classic Chiang (1984) formulas,
confidence intervals are calculated via a bootstrap procedure with 1000 replications.8
3.1 Remaining Life Expectancy at Age 65 by EPpers
First consider the light bars in Figure 2. These depict e65 for the full sample of pensioners
that we use. Overall remaining life expectancy is at 15.74 years, we postpone a comparison
to estimates for the general population until the end of this section. The mortality estimates
by earnings points group range from 14.35 years (35-39 EPpers) to 18.65 years (70-74
EPpers). Between these two extremes, life expectancy rises roughly linearly over the groups.
All differences among them are statistically significant at any typical confidence level.
The most striking finding at first glance is that the minimum life expectancy is reached
close to the middle of the table and not in the lowest income group. At the bottom of
the distribution, e65 is up to more than fifteen years again. This is quite contrary to
overwhelming international evidence which indicates a monotone and positive relationship
between income and life expectancy. However, there is a plausible reason at hand. As
8We are very grateful to Evgueni Andreev for sharing his VBA code for bootstrapping life-tables.
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Figure 2: Remaining Life Expectancy at Age 65 in years by EPpers
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Note: Comparison of all pensioners with the respective amount of EPpers and those who are mandatorily
insured in the public health insurance scheme with at least 25 years of pension-relevant insurance periods
(HI25Y). The vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals
explained in the last section, we expect a very heterogeneous group at the lower end of the
distribution because of persons who were covered by the pension system only during parts
of their working life. These are typically well-earning academics who would be at the right
tail of the distribution if we were to observe their full earnings history. To take a colourful
example, we would expect to find production line workers next to their company’s CEO in
these groups.
A way to shed light on this issue is to exclude those for whom lifetime earnings are not
observed very well. We try to do so by selecting only those who are mandatorily enrolled
in the public mutual funds health insurance system or those who spent at least 25 years in
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the system. The dark bars in Figure 2 indicate the results if we impose both restrictions.
For brevity reasons we do not present the results if selection is based upon one criterion
only. Again the tables are available upon request.
To begin with, note that overall remaining life expectancy drops substantially by more
than half a year. Hence the fourteen percent that we excluded from the original sample
must have a much higher life expectancy than the remaining selection. While it rises slightly
in the top two earnings points categories, it drops significantly in all other subgroups. The
decline is particularly pronounced in the lowest income categories. Minimum e65 is now
13.31 years for those with 25-29 EPpers, the slight rise for the lowest income category is
only borderline significant. We suspect this differential drop to be a combination of two
effects. On the one hand, the relative size of the sample that is excluded is much higher at
lower earnings points levels (57% in the lowest category as compared to less than 10% in
the top seven classes, see Figure 3). On the other hand, if the excluded group is relatively
homogeneous, the differential in e65 is largest in the lower categories under the hypothesis
of a monotonic relationship between income and mortality.
We presume that this control is far from being perfect, hence we only have a lower bound
for the mortality differential. This argument is reinforced through the right censoring of
annual EPpersit - neither can we clearly identify the top nor the bottom earners. Note that
somebody in the lowest mortality group of 30-34 EPpers still would have worked 40 years
at 3/4 of average wage. If somebody was living on social assistance most of the time, he
would not even enter our dataset. However, even this lower bound on differences in life
expectancy is quite substantial. Taking the results from the “HI25Y” selection and the
15
Figure 3: The distribution of EPpers by Sample Selection
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Note: “All” includes all available observations, “HI25Y” incorporates only those mandatorily enrolled in
the public health insurance scheme with at least 25 years of pension-relevant insurance periods.
unconditional e65 as a starting point, persons in the highest income group can expect to
live 25 percent longer. On the other hand, if only 25-29 EPpers were accumulated, it is
12 percent less.
Our results compare quite well with all-population mortality. Official statistics indicate
a remaining life expectancy at age 65 for German males in 2002 of 16.08 years (HMD 2006)
This is about 4 months higher than our estimates for the full sample indicate. In terms
of socio-economic status and mortality experience, most of the persons not covered in our
data should be roughly comparable to those in that were excluded when we imposed the
“HI25Y” restriction. Simplifying the matter a bit, the main difference between them is that
one group worked for a few years in a job that covered them in the public pension system
and then changed to another one; the other group started in such another job already.
Following this argument we did expect a qualitatively similar rise in life expectancy if we
move from “All” to the full population as the one that we see when moving from “HI25Y”
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Figure 4: Decomposition of Life Expectancy Differentials by Age Group, relative to Un-
conditional Mortality
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Note: Only the persons mandatorily enrolled in the public health insurance scheme with at least 25 years
of pension-relevant insurance periods are included in the analysis (selection HI25Y).
to “All”.
Using the method due to Arriaga (1984), we can decompose the contributions to life
expectancy by age group. Figure 4 breaks down the mortality differentials for each EPpers-
group by 5-year age bands relative to unconditional mortality. Basically, this works by
replacing the respective age classes of the income-differentiated death probabilities by the
unconditional ones. It becomes immediately clear that the bulk of the difference between
income groups stems from mortality before age 75. Beyond 80 years of age, non-negligible
discrepancies exist only for the two highest earnings classes. Given the high weight that
e65 puts on the lower age classes, this result does not come as a surprise to us.
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Figure 5: Mortality Rate by EPpers
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Note: Only the persons mandatorily enrolled in the public health insurance scheme with at least 25 years
of pension-relevant insurance periods are included in the analysis (selection HI25Y).
Finally, Figure 5 shows mortality rates for selected income groups under the “HI25Y”
restriction. They were calculated separately for each one-year age band. The most salient
feature of the graph is that their shape is very similar, they seem to differ by little more
than a parallel shift. Confidence bands for each age are not shown in order to keep the
graphs readable. Until age 74, all three are statistically different from each other at the
95%-level. Mortality rates in the highest income group are significantly lower than the
other two even until age 88.
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3.2 Mortality by EPpers and EPCP
The purpose of this section is to contrast the two different measures of lifetime earnings for
those persons where both are available. These are the cohorts born 1929 and later because
most of them did not retire before 1992. Remaining life expectancy is not a suitable
summary statistic anymore because we do not have any information on old-age mortality
conditional on EPCP . As an alternative, we chose the probability of reaching age 74 (this
is the highest we can do) conditional on reaching age 65 (P65{74}). Results are shown in
Figure 6. The light bars depict P65{74} conditional on EPpers, the dark ones show the
corresponding values based on EPCP .
Overall probabilities are identical at 76.4 percent because we use the same sample
in both cases. In the case of EPpers, we find very much the same pattern as for life
expectancy in the last section. There is a linear decline from the highest income class to
those persons with 35-39 EPpers which then levels out and rises again at the very bottom.
The dark bars look quite similar, but there are some important differences. On the one
hand, probabilities are slightly higher for all groups with more than 35 EPCP . However,
the decline does not level out at this point but continues linearly to the very lowest group.
Based on this measure, 65-year-old individuals in the highest earnings class have a ninety
percent probability of reaching age 74. Less than two thirds in the bottom category survive
to this age.
Our conclusions from this exercise are twofold. On the one hand, it does not matter
much whether one uses EPpers or EPCP if one is interested in the mortality experience for
19
Figure 6: Probability of Reaching Age 74 at Age 65 by EPpers
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Note: Only the persons mandatorily enrolled in the public health insurance scheme with at least 25 years
of pension-relevant insurance periods are included in the analysis (selection HI25Y). The vertical bars
indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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individuals with at least 35 EPpers. Our summary statistics differ by not much more than
a constant that is mostly explained by the average differential of 3 points between the two
measures (see the first two rows of Table 3). On the other hand, the choice of variable
does matter in lower categories. By using EPCP as a measure of lifetime earnings, we
can reproduce the monotonic relationship to mortality that is documented in international
studies.
In the course of the analysis of this chapter we also checked whether differences exist if
we condition on actual contribution periods (CP) rather than pension-relevant insurance
periods (IPPR). One might have expected analogous differences as in the case of the two
earnings measures. However, none such differences became apparent which is why we do
not include a graph on that point.
3.3 Life Expectancy at Age 65 by EPpers and Place of Residence
In this section, we compare the mortality experience of people living in the former socialist
part of Germany with those living in western Germany. This is particularly interesting
to look at because of the very different biographies of people living in either part.9 One
could expect several things to happen in the eastern part. There could be a long-run
effect of the more equal distribution of socio-economic status during the socialist era,
resulting in smaller mortality differentials. The opposite story might read that the sharp
9In our interpretations of this section, we neglect migration between the two regions. People in our
sample were at least 53 years old at the time of reunification, so we do not expect any substantial migration
movements that would blur our results
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transformation in the early 1990s led to higher inequality than in the West. Finally, one
could imagine relatively quick adaption to the new institutional arrangement, hence a
picture that parallels that in the West.
Naturally, the first thing to evaluate is e65 not stratified by income. We find it to
be 15.83 years in the West and 15.41 years in the East. The difference is statistically
significant at any common confidence level. This compares to full-population estimates
from official statistics of 16.19 years and 15.39 years, respectively. In the West we have the
effect described above: The 23% of the population not included in our sample tend to have
a lower mortality than the pensioners. On the other hand, the 94% coverage in the East
leads to almost identical estimates of all-population mortality, so we are very confident to
have a complete depiction of the full population there. Our findings are consistent with the
converging mortality experiences in the East and in the West that have been documented
by several authors (cf. for example Nolte, Shkolnikov, and McKee (2000)).
Again, the main analysis concerns the comparison of life expectancy by income group.
As in the previous sections, we select upon mandatory enrollment in the public mutual
funds health care system and 25 years of coverage in the pension system. The reason
not to consider all-pensioner mortality here is that groups are more comparable in the
restricted sample. As discussed in Section 2.2, we expect much more heterogeneity in
terms of earnings outside the system in the West than in the East, particularly in the
lowest categories. This is because in the former GDR, virtually everybody was insured
in the system. Hence we would obtain a stronger bias within income classes if we did
not impose the restrictions. The reason is the larger heterogeneity with respect to socio-
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Figure 7: Remaining Life Expectancy at Age 65 in years by Place of Residence and EPpers
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Note: Only the persons mandatorily insured in the public health insurance scheme with at least 25 years
of pension-relevant insurance periods are included in the analysis (selection HI25Y). The vertical bars
indicate 95% confidence intervals.
economic status in the West. The restriction of the sample makes the analysis within
categories more meaningful, but a comparison of the unconditional life expectancies does
not make much sense. This becomes clear from the rightmost bars in Figure 7. While e65
does not change for pensioners in the east of Germany, imposing the restriction leads to a
drop in remaining life expectancy to 15.14 years in the West. This reversal is due to the
fact that we excluded a large group of men with high socio-economic status in the West
and only few persons in the East.
Comparing the graphs for both regions in Figure 7, it becomes apparent that no dif-
ference between them can be asserted for groups with more than 40 EPpers. In all groups
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Figure 8: The distribution of EPpers by Place of Residence
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Note: Only the persons mandatorily insured in the public health insurance scheme with at least 25 years
of pension-relevant insurance periods are included in the analysis (selection HI25Y).
below that level, life expectancy in the West emerges larger than in the East. Most notably,
we find a close to strongly monotone relationship between income and life expectancy in
the East (the rise in the bottom group is not detectable in a statistical sense for either re-
gion). In the lowest two groups in the East, e65 is only around eleven years, eight years less
than at the top of the distribution. We do not take this as evidence for more inequality in
the East. It is more likely that our selection procedure still does not enable us to pinpoint
people with low socio-economic status in the West, just as the analysis from Section 3.2
suggests. The higher life expectancy in the East for this particular selection arises because
the distribution of earnings points is shifted to the right as compared to western Germany,
see Figure 8. In other words, there are relatively more people in the higher income classes
with a longer life expectancy.
A second thing to note is the striking similarity of the results in the income classes from
40 EPpers on upwards. This is somewhat surprising given that biographies have been quite
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different. One part lived for forty years in a socialist country with severely restricted civil
rights, comparatively small wage differentials, high job security, an economy with a large
amount of goods rationing, etc. People on the other side of the wall experienced much
higher wage differentials, somewhat lower job security, a market economy, and quite well
protected civil rights. Only from 1990 on - the cohorts in our analysis were already at least
53 years old - institutional arrangements started to converge, although large differences
remain, for example on labour markets. Furthermore, not even our income measure is
strictly comparable. If EPpers is interpreted as actual retirement income, there is still a
13%-difference between the two (see Section 2.1) that is not compensated by lower prices in
the East. The interpretation of lifetime earnings remains difficult because actual purchasing
power from one EPpers was extremely different in the GDR as compared to the FRG. Our
understanding of the similarity finding is that EPpers contains many “deep” parameters
that are related to mortality and survive institutional arrangements. Examples include
education, intelligence, social skills and networks, or genetics. Put differently, EPpers could
be a very broad measure of socio-economic status that yields a ranking of people which is
remarkably stable across some forms of societal organisation. This argument is reinforced
through institutional features from the GDR. Higher qualified employees were more likely
to have a so-called “Voluntary Additional Insurance”, resulting in higher differentiation of
earnings points than that of current labour income. Hence, EPpers would reflect a broader
measure of socio-economic status than the level of material resources.
Our analysis sheds a new light on previous findings from the epidemiological literature.
Several authors reported a larger predictive power of income for health measures in the
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West than in the East (Mielck et al. (2000), Nolte and McKee (2004)). Our results suggest
this to be a consequence of measurement error, unless the link between morbidity and
mortality works differently between both parts of Germany. The relevant income concept
as a marker for socio-economic status is a long-run measure, the surveys employed in the
cited studies contain a current income variable. Transitory fluctuations, for example due
to high unemployment in the East, may well impact strongly upon the analysis.
3.4 International Comparisons
In this section, we place our results in the context of the literature on differential mortality.
Closest in terms of regional proximity and research question is certainly Reil-Held (2000).
She uses survey panel data and finds a life expectancy differential of 10 years between the
top and the bottom quartile of the income distribution, employing a somewhat broader
household income variable that is averaged across time. This is in the bivariate analysis
that is comparable to our approach, confidence intervals are not reported. Both results
go together very well - she computes e37 and the four-year difference between our findings
will be more than accounted for by mortality until age 65. We take this as a supporting
evidence for our result of a lower bound of six years on the difference in e65 between the
top and the bottom income class.
Expanding the region under consideration and the variables measuring socio-economic
status, the study by Huisman et al. (2004) serves well to place our results in a European
context. They analyse differential mortality by education and housing tenure and find
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results that are quite similar to ours in qualitative terms. Throughout the eleven countries
included in their study, relative mortality risks declined in age, but absolute mortality
differences remained constant or increased until old age. This is exactly what we find from
Figure 5. It is impossible to compare numbers because of the differences in covariates,
furthermore the authors do not report life expectancies.
Further corroborative evidence for our findings comes from the US - Deaton and Paxson
(2004) report e25 to be about 10 years lower for members of families with an annual
income of less than $5,000 as compared to those earning more than $50,000. Findings
from Attanasio and Hoynes (2000) suggest that the gradient linking income and mortality
is steepest at the bottom of the distribution. This is supportive of our view that we cannot
identify people at the lower end of the distribution very well. Finally, turning back to
Europe, Attanasio and Emmerson (2003) show that the position in the wealth ranking has
a large impact on survival probabilities in the UK. Palme and Sandgren (2004) are able
to construct a measure of lifetime income for a cohort born in 1928 in the city of Malmo¨,
Sweden. They find this variable to be only marginally significant in the case of prime-
age mortality. However, their sample size is rather small and they conduct their analyses
conditional on parental income. Overall, we conclude that our findings for Germany fit in
very well with the existing literature on socio-economic status and mortality.
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4 Conclusions
We found large differentials in remaining life expectancy at age 65 across classes of lifetime
earnings in Germany. Due to the nature of our data, we were only able to put a lower
bound of six years on the difference from the lowest to the highest income group. Between
the two extremes, life expectancy rises linearly in earnings. Since we employed entirely
nonparametric methods, this is not an artefact of any assumed functional form.
Comparing the former GDR with the rest of Germany, we found virtually no differ-
ences in life expectancy within income groups, except for the lowest groups. However, the
latter seems to be due to peculiarities of our data. Hence, any aggregate difference in life
expectancy is likely owed to composition effects. This finding is quite remarkable because
of the very different institutional design people in either part were faced with during the
prime ages of their working life.
What do we learn from these results? For one thing, there is a very sizeable effect,
even among the elderly, waiting to be explained. Which of the three channels mentioned
in the introduction is responsible for how much of the differential? Economic analyses
suggest that in the socio-economic status to health causation, income is not likely to play
a large role (compare, for example, Adams, Hurd, McFadden, Merrill, and Ribeiro (2003),
Meer, Miller, and Rosen (2003), or Smith (2004)). Another finding that deserves further
illumination is the similarity of life expectancy in the East and in the West conditional
on lifetime earnings. Finally, an interesting research question lies in the temporal changes
of mortality. How was the gain in life expectancy over the last ten years distributed
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over different subgroups of the population? Did the poor or the rich gain more or was it
evenly distributed? Is this trend likely to continue? Answers to these questions have a
large impact on pension finance, the organisation of nursing home care, and many other
important policy questions.
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A Tables
Table 1: Sample Size and Coverage of the General Population by Cohort
Birthyear West East
All HI 25Y HI25Y All HI 25Y HI25Y
before 1902 494 396 355 283 154 130 151 127
(64%) (51%) (46%) (37%) (96%) (81%) (94%) (79%)
1902 - 1906 7,425 6,649 5,691 5,202 2,307 2,115 2,267 2,082
(60%) (54%) (46%) (42%) (98%) (90%) (96%) (88%)
1907 - 1911 52,680 48,448 43,557 41,152 13,874 13,339 13,795 13,269
(61%) (56%) (50%) (48%) (95%) (91%) (94%) (91%)
1912 - 1916 152,514 135,688 126,505 116,739 35,139 34,281 34,987 34,158
(71%) (63%) (59%) (54%) (96%) (93%) (95%) (93%)
1917 - 1921 321,267 288,243 268,837 247,470 73,661 72,450 73,381 72,216
(76%) (68%) (64%) (59%) (92%) (90%) (92%) (90%)
1922 - 1926 629,208 579,373 532,667 498,207 141,318 139,044 140,761 138,571
(76%) (70%) (64%) (60%) (91%) (89%) (90%) (89%)
1927 - 1931 1,015,922 931,499 927,315 855,694 272,274 265,174 271,711 264,689
(79%) (72%) (72%) (66%) (93%) (91%) (93%) (91%)
1932 - 1936 1,301,622 1,155,290 1,273,053 1,140,150 393,716 372,431 393,438 372,273
(78%) (69%) (76%) (68%) (97%) (92%) (97%) (92%)
Total 3,481,132 3,145,586 3,177,980 2,904,897 932,443 898,964 930,491 897,385
(77%) (70%) (70%) (64%) (94%) (91%) (94%) (91%)
Note: Sample Size as number of pensioners, coverage of the general population in parentheses. “All”
includes all pensioners in the respective age range with more than 20 EPpers. “HI” restricts the sample to
individuals who are furthermore mandatorily insured within the public health insurance scheme. “25Y”
considers only pensioners with more than 20 EPpers and more than 25 years of pension-relevant insurance
periods. “HI25Y” imposes both the “HI” and “25Y” restrictions. Source: DRV (2005b), HMD (2006),
own calculations.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for all Individuals
Variable West East
All HI 25Y HI25Y All HI 25Y HI25Y
EPpers 47.9 48.7 48.7 49.2 52.0 52.2 52.0 52.2
(12.8) (12.2) (12.4) (11.9) (10.6) (10.5) (10.6) (10.4)
IPPR 39.0 39.5 42.3 42.5 44.1 44.2 44.2 44.3
(11.4) (11.3) (4.4) (4.1) (2.7) (2.6) (2.0) (1.9)
HI=1 0.904 1.000 0.914 1.000 0.964 1.000 0.964 1.000
HI=2 0.092 0.000 0.082 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.034 0.000
HI=3 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000
GERMAN 0.968 0.969 0.972 0.973 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998
REPAT 0.049 0.050 0.052 0.052 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015
MIN PENS 0.043 0.041 0.046 0.045 0.016 0.015 0.016 0.015
DEAD 0.051 0.053 0.053 0.055 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051
Note: Mean of variables, standard errors in parentheses where appropriate. “HI=1,2,3:” Health insurance
coverage by: mandatory public mutual funds, voluntary mutual funds or private insurance company,
insurance under foreign law. “GERMAN” shows the fraction of pensioners with German citizenship, “MIN
PENS” the fraction entitled for a scaling-up of EPCP due to low earnings before 1992, and “DEAD” the
fraction that died during 2002.
“All” includes all pensioners in the respective age range with more than 20 EPpers. “HI” restricts the
sample to individuals who are furthermore mandatorily insured within the public health insurance scheme.
“25Y” considers only pensioners with more than 20 EPpers and more than 25 years of pension-relevant
insurance periods. “HI25Y” imposes both the “HI” and “25Y” restrictions. Source: DRV (2005b), own
calculations.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Individuals born after 1928
Variable West East
All HI 25Y HI25Y All HI 25Y HI25Y
EPpers 47.6 48.3 48.1 48.6 50.9 51.1 50.9 51.1
(12.6) (11.9) (12.2) (11.7) (10.3) (10.1) (10.3) (10.1)
EPCP 44.9 45.6 45.6 46.0 47.4 47.4 47.4 47.5
(12.9) (12.3) (12.6) (12.1) (9.8) (9.6) (9.8) (9.6)
IPPR 41.0 41.4 42.4 42.6 44.0 44.1 44.1 44.1
(8.0) (7.8) (4.3) (4.0) (2.4) (2.2) (2.1) (2.0)
CP 37.8 38.3 38.4 38.7 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9
(7.6) (7.2) (6.9) (6.8) (6.9) (6.8) (6.8) (6.8)
HI=1 0.896 1.000 0.903 1.000 0.953 1.000 0.954 1.000
HI=2 0.099 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.044 0.000
HI=3 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000
GERMAN 0.956 0.957 0.962 0.963 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998
REPAT 0.062 0.063 0.063 0.064 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018
MIN PENS 0.038 0.036 0.039 0.037 0.020 0.018 0.020 0.018
DEAD 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029
Note: Mean of variables, standard errors in parentheses where appropriate. “HI=1,2,3:” Health insurance
coverage by: mandatory public mutual funds, voluntary mutual funds or private insurance company,
insurance under foreign law. “GERMAN” shows the fraction of pensioners with German citizenship, “MIN
PENS” the fraction entitled for a scaling-up of EPCP due to low earnings before 1992, and “DEAD” the
fraction that died during 2002.
“All” includes all pensioners in the respective age range with more than 20 EPpers. “HI” restricts the
sample to individuals who are furthermore mandatorily insured within the public health insurance scheme.
“25Y” considers only pensioners with more than 20 EPpers and more than 25 years of pension-relevant
insurance periods. “HI25Y” imposes both the “HI” and “25Y” restrictions. Source: DRV (2005b), own
calculations.
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